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Basic-Level Superiority
Abstract
In a seminal paper, E. Rosch, C. B. Mervis, W. D. Gray,
D. M. Johnson, and P. Boyes-Braem (Cognitive Psychology,
1976, r, 382-439) found that an object can be categorized
faster at the basic level (e.g.,hammer) than at either a
subordinate (club hammer) or a superordinate level (tool);
they attributed this result to basic categories having more
distinctive attributes. But numerous factors other than the
number of distinctive attributes might .have caused this
result; for example, basic categories routinely have shorter
and more frequent names than do subordinates, and are
typically learned earlier and occur more often than either
subordinate or superordinate categories. In this paper, we
report three experiments, all of which used artificial
subordinate, basic, and superordinate categories, and all of
which either held constant or systematically varied several
of these "other" factors. All three studies replicated the
finding that objects can be categorized fastest at the basic
level (but the relative speeds of subordinate and
superordinate categorizations differed from past results);
and all three strongly supported the claim that distinctive
attributes are the factor underlying the results, though it
appears that only perceptual attributes are critical.
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Basic-Level Superiority in Picture Categorization
When categorizing objects, people must compare
perceptual information derived from the object to their
stored knowledge of various categories. Typically, the
object will match categories at different levels, and two
plausible notions lead to opposite predictions about which
level of categorization should be easiest. One notion is
that it will be easiest to categorize an object into large,
abstract categories, since they have few attributes (or
features) common to their members. The second notion is
that it should be easiest to categorize an object into very
specific categories, because more of the object's attributes
will find a match. Experiments on picture categorization
indicate that both notions are incorrect. Rosch, Mervis,
Gray, Johnson and Boyes-Braem (1976) found that people take
longer to categorize objects into more specific or more
abstract categories than into categories at an intermediate
level, which Rosch et al. had previously defined as the
basic level of categorization. The purpose of this article
is to determine why objects are categorized fastest at the
basic level.
Evidence for a Basic-level Superiority
Rosch et al. (1976) operationally defined the basic
level as that at which categories are the most
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differentiated, i.e., have the maximal number of distinctive
attributes. They showed that objects in a basic-level
category (e.g., chair) had many attributes in common,
whereas members of more general, or superordinate,
categories (furniture) had fewer attributes in common. On
the other hand, more specific, or subordinate, categories
(kitchen chair, reclining chair) had a few more attributes
common to their members than did basic categories, but they
also tended to have a greater overlap of attributes between
categories. (Rosch et al. also claimed that basic
categories have a higher cue validity than other categories,
but this claim has been disputed by Murphy, in press, so we
have not tested it here.)
Because basic categories are more differentiated, Rosch
et al. (1976) suggested that objects are first identified as
members of those categories. To gain support for this, in
one of their experiments (Expt. 7) Rosch et al. presented
subjects with a category name and then, one-half second
later, with a photograph of an object. The subjects decided
whether or not the object in the photograph was in the named
category, which was either a subordinate, basic, or
superordinate category. Subjects responded fastest for
basic categories and slowest for subordinate ones. Rosch et
al. suggested that objects are generally identified first as
members of basic categories, with superordinate membership
then inferred (e.g., if the object is a car, it.must also be
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a vehicle), and subordinate membership decided by
observation of additional features.
While Rosch et al. (1976) performed other experiments
(e.g. detection and same-different tasks) that compared
performance with subordinate, basic and superordinate
categories, these experiments are not as theoretically
significant as the picture categorization study we just
described. The latter is the only task that Rosch et al.
used that directly taps categorization processes--it
explicitly requires subjects to categorize objects--rather
than, say, to decide whether two objects are the same or
different. Also, as Rosch et al. (p. 413) point out, their
categorization task is one of the few tasks that shows an
advantage of basic over subordinate categories. Picture-
categorization tasks employed by other investigators have
contrasted only basic and superordinate categories
(Brownell, 1978; Smith, Balzano, & Walker, 1978).
Problems with Rosch at A Evidence
There are numerous problems in interpreting the results
of Rosch et al's picture-categorization experiment. We will
discuss three specific variables that were confounded with
the distinction between basic and subordinate categories,
any one. of which could account for why basic categories were
responded to faster than subordinate ones. One variable was
name length; subordinate names were two or more words long,
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whereas (with one exception) basic names were one word long.
With only half a second between hearing the name and seeing
the picture, slower comprehension of subordinate names may
have been responsible for slower categorization at this
level. A second confounding was that subjects may have been
totally unfamiliar with some subordinates used (e.g., cross-
cutting handsaw, claw hammer), whereas this seems unlikely
for the basic categories. The third confounding was that
the differentiating features of some subordinates may have
been impossible to perceive in the photographs (e.g., green
seedless rapes and cling peaches), whereas this was not the
case for the basic level. While this last confound is
relatively easy to remove, the first two are not when using
natural language categories; this suggests the need for
artificial categories, which is the tack we will take in the
following experiments.
In addition to the above three variables, there were
other factors in the Rosch et al. studies that were
correlated with the level-of-category factor and that could
have caused the effect attributed to levels. These other
factors are more general than the "specific confoundings"
just discussed; they are more like alternative hypotheses to
Rosch et al.'s differentiation explanation of their basic-
level superiority. In other words, these factors speak to
the question of what makes basic categories "basic."
Basic-Level Superiority
6
One alternative hypothesis is that basic categories are
superior because they are learned first (see Anglin, 1977).
For example, if a child learns the category car some years
before vehicle, then s/he may continue to categorize cars as
instances of car simply out of "habit." Another hypothesis
attributes the basic category advantage to a familiarity
factor, reflecting either the frequency of the category, the
frequency of its name, or both. Basic category names
certainly occur more frequently than subordinate names and
there may be a difference between basic and superordinates
1
in frequency as well. There is also another type of
frequency that might be used to explain the basic-level
superiority--conjoint frequency between a category, or its
name, and an object. Even if the total frequency of the
words car and vehicle were the same, objects that are in
fact cars (Chevrolets, Toyotas, VWs, etc.) may be referred
to by the word car more frequently than they are referred to
by the word vehicle. Thus, although car and vehicle are
equally familiar, the basic name is the preferred label for
most cars.
All three of these explanations--order of learning,
category frequency, and conjoint frequency--are alternatives
to Rosch et al's differentiation hypothesis, but it is
difficult to compare them experimentally with natural-
language materials. In the following experiments we were
able to vary aspects of the category structures and learning
procedures to evaluate these hypotheses.
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Experiment 1
The main purposes of this experiment were: (1) to
determine if pictures are categorized fastest at the basic
level when the three specific confounds described earlier
have been removed; and (2) to evaluate the alternative
explanations of the basic-level's superiority.
Fourteen hierarchically-organized categories of novel
tools were used. To demonstrate that they resemble natural
categories in important ways, we will describe their
construction in detail. First, four highly distinctive
tools were drawn to be the bases for the four basic
categories. If one considers hand tools to consist of a
handle, a shaft, and a head, then each of these basic tools
was designed to be distinct from the others in each part.
An example from each category is in Figure 1. For ease of
exposition, they will be called hammer, brick, knife, and
pizza cutter (subjects never heard these names).
The next step was to construct subordinate categories.
Each of the four basic tools was differentiated into two
subordinates in the following ways: (1) the hammer had a
wide or narrow head; (2) the brick had a single or a two-
part handle; (3) the pizza cutter had a long of a short
shaft (e.g., the proportion of horizontal to vertical length
(knife)
( brick ) (pizza cutter)
Figure 1. Examples of the four basic tools used in
Experiment 1.
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of the shaft varied); and (4) the knife's edge was serrated
or straight. To form the superordinates, the hammer and
brick were grouped together to produce a category, which for
ease of exposition we will call pounders, while the knife
and pizza cutter were grouped together to form a
superordinate we will call cutters. Figure 2 shows the
resulting hierarchical structure of 14 categories (2
superordinates, 4 basics, and 8 subordinates). Associated
witho each category is a CVC that served as its name in the
experiment. Note that below the level of subordinates are
actual instances, a total of 16 of them, which were created
by making a large and small version of each subordinate
item.
Do these categories resemble natural subordinate, basic
and superordinate categories? They do, according to the
three criteria noted by Rosch et al. (1976): (1)
Superordinates have only one attribute common to their
members (function), basics have many such attributes (e.g.,
the general shapes of the head, shaft and handle), and
subordinates have only one additional attribute common to
their members; (2) The basic level is the highest level at
which one can make a unified visual representation of the
category--e.g., no mental image could represent all cutters
or all pounders; (3) The superordinates are defined
functionally (see Rosch et al., p. 392).
SUPERORDINATE
BASIC
SUBORDINATE
INSTANCE
HOB (pounder)
BOT (hommer) REL (brick)-
COM VAD
(wide (narrow
head) head)
L S L SL S L S
LAR ZIM
(one-port (two-part
handle) handle)
L S SL S L S
SOM(cutter)
PIM(knife)
WAM TIS
(straight (serrated)
edge)
L S L S
NOP(pizzo cutter)
MUL FAC
(short (long
shoft) shaft)
/\ SLL S L S
Figure 2. The hierarchy of categories used in Experiment 1.
The names in parentheses are for expository
purposes only--the CVCs were used as category
names in the experiment. The lowest level in the
hierarchy denotes the actual pictures used,
either a large (L) or small (S) copy of the
subordinate tool.
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The categories in Figure 2 enabled us to eliminate the
three confounds that involved subordinates in the Rosch et
al. (1976) study. First, by using CVCs as category names,
we insured that all names were equal in length as well as in
familiarity. Second, subjects were told the relevant
features of all categories, so none was particularly
unfamiliar. Third, all differentiating features were
perceivable. Other aspects of the design were relevant to
the order of learning, category-frequency and conjoint-
frequency explanations of the basic-level superiority.
Method
Subjects. Thirty-six Stanford undergraduates
participated for pay or to fulfill a course requirement.
They were divided evenly into three groups differing in
learning order (see below).
Materials. The pictures were of the sixteen specific
tools described earlier (see bottom row of Figure 2),
photocopied for the learning phase and mounted on slides for
the test phase.
The fourteen category names were chosen from Underwood
and Schultz's (1960) listing of CVC's with pronounceability
ratings below 3.00 on a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 is highly
pronounceable. The names used were the syllables from this
set with the fourteen lowest meaningfulness ratings on
Basic-Level Superiority
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Archer's (1960) norms. The syllables were randomly assigned
to the fourteen categories.
.Procedurer Learning phase. Subjects were tested
individually. The basic-first group learned the basic
categories first, the subordinates second, and the
superordinates last. The subordinate-first group learned
the categories in the order: subordinates, superordinates,
and basics. The superordinate-fiirst group learned the
categories in the order: superordinates, subordinates and
basics. If early learning is the cause of basic-level
superiority, then whichever category is learned first will
be the fastest.
In all three groups, each category was taught with (a)
a verbal description, and (b) photocopied pictures of the
tools in that category. First, subjects read the
description. It gave the category name and a reason for
grouping these particular tools in the same category (for
subordinates, the reason was the differentiating feature;
for superordinates, the reason was the function; and for
basic categories, the reason was similar shape). The
description also reminded subjects of any previously-learned
categories that included tools in the current category; for
example, a description of a superordinate category might
mention the names of the two basic categories that were its
3.
constituents. After reading the description, subjects
si-,iiaied the pictures for as long as they wished.
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When all the categories at one level had been
presented, subjects were tested on them before learning the
next level of categories. The test was an unspeeded version
of the categorization task that would be used in the next
phase. On each trial, the experimenter said a category
name, and then immediately pushed a button, which served to
open a shutter on the slide projector after a one second
delay. The slide contained a picture of a tool, and
subjects indicated whether or not the pictured tool was in
the named category by pressing a true or false button: they
had been instructed to take as much time as needed in
reaching their decision. For each level, there were 2
blocks of 16 trials, during which each picture was presented
at least twice, preceded once by the correct and once by an
incorrect category name. Feedback was given on each trial.
Trials that led to errors were repeated at the end, and if
subjects repeated an error or made more than four errors on
a block, they were tested on an additional block. Most
subjects finished each level in two blocks and none needed
more than four.
Though the conjoint-frequency of a category-picture
pair was held constant across levels in the learning trials,
the overall frequency of a category was greatest for
superordinates and least for subordinates. It is impossible
to hold constant both conjoint frequency and category
frequency if the categories are hierarchically organized,
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because the superordinate categories have more members than
either of the other levels, and basic categories have more
members than subordinate categories. If a category name is
presented once with each of its members, the overall
frequency must vary. Note, though, that the variation in
category frequency favored superordinates, not basics, so
the variation should not induce a basic-level superiority.
Categorization Phase. After learning all the levels,
each subject was tested individually in a categorization
task. The task was the same as that used in the learning
phase, except that now: (1) each block of trials contained
categories at all three levels; (2) instructions emphasized
speed as well as accuracy; and (3) depression of either the
true or false button stopped a reaction-time (RT) clock.
(Half the subjects in each group used the index fingers of
their dominant and nondominant hands to push the true and
false buttons, respectively, while the remaining subjects
had the reverse assignment.) The experimenter recorded the
RT, changed the slide, and immediately started the next
trial.
The categorization task had 10 blocks of 28 trials
each, with the first two blocks being considered practice.
For all blocks, at each category level, half the trials
required a true response and half a false response. Over
the eight experimental blocks, each category name was
Basic-Level Superiority
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presented equally often on true trials, but with some random
variation on false trials (see below). Each picture served
in a total of 8 subordinate trials, 4 basic ones, and 2
superordinate ones (with half at each level being true
trials). The order of the blocks, and of the trials in each
block, was determined by different random permutations for
each subject.
The nature of the false trials in a block requires more
explanation. For trials with subordinates, the picture and
category name could be from either: (1) the same basic
category (e.g., the category named the serrated knife, and
the picture was of the straight knife); (2) the same
superordinate but a different basic category (e.g., the
category named the serrated knife and the picture contained
a pizza cutter); or (3) a different superordinate (e.g., the
category named the serrated knife and the picture was of a
brick). These three different trial types offer a variation
in how related the category and picture are, and previous
work has shown that increases in relatedness lead to
increases in false RTs (e.g., Gunther & Klatzky, 1977; Smith
et al., 1978). Each block in the present experiment
included two trials of Type (1) and three each of Types (2)
and (3). (The actual category names used with each picture
was chosen randomly, within the constraints of each type.)
We also included a variation in relatedness for the false
trials with basic names: on two trials the picture was from
Basic-Level Superiority
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the same superordinate as the name, and on two it was from a
different superordinate. Finally, for those false trials
where the name was at the superordinate level, no variation
in relatedness was possible: the target category and
picture were always unrelated.
Results
The RTs were averaged and submitted to analyses of
variance after discarding any times greater than three
seconds. Only correct responses were analyzed, and errors
and wild scores were replaced by the mean of that cell for
that subject. Error frequencies were too low to allow
statistical analysis: the averages were 2.8%, 1.8% and 2.2%
for the subordinate-, basic-, and superordinate-first
groups, respectively. Discarded scores were less than 1% of
the total responses for all three groups.
True RTs. The mean RTs are in Table 1. Separate
ANOVAs were performed for each learning group, with level of
category, trial-block, and subjects as factors. For each
group, basic categories were responded to fastest, followed
by subordinates and then superordinates; the overall
differences due to levels were reliable, £(2,22) = 15.23, p
< .001, 14.60, r < .001 and 3.51, - <.05 for the
subordinate-, basic-, and superordinate-first groups,
respectively. Subjects in the superordinate-first group
tended to get faster over blocks, E(7,77) = 4.10, F < .005,
Basic-Level Superiority
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but this speed-up was not obtained for the other two groups.
More importantly, the ordering with respect to levels did
not change with practice in any condition, all p's > .20.
Further tests focused on specific comparisons. Within
the subordinate- and basic- first groups, basic
categorizations were faster than subordinate ones, which in
turn were faster than superordinates ones (all comparisons,
p < .04, by two-tailed sign tests). For the superordinate-
first group, basic categorizations were faster than
categorizations at the other two levels, £(1,22) = 5.51, p <
.05, but the 44 msec difference between subordinate and
superordinate levels was not reliable, p > .20.
False RT. The false RTs in Table 2 are from trials
where the category and picture were drawn from different
superordinates; by focusing on only unrelated trials, we
avoided any confounding between category level and category-
picture relatedness (since superordinate false trials were
always unrelated, but this was not the case for the other
two levels). These false RTs resemble the true data in
showing that basic categorizations are faster than
superordinate ones; however, subordinates are now slightly
faster than basics. In both the subordinate- and basic-
first groups, all twelve subjects responded slowest to
superordinate categories (p = .0004), while the differences
between basics and subordinates were nonsignificant by
Basic-Level Superiority
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contrasts, E(2,22) < 1 for both groups. The difference due
to levels for the superordinate-first group was
nonsignificant, £(2,22) = 1.12. The effect of blocks, and
its interaction with levels, did not approach significance
for any group.
To assess the effects of relatedness on false RTs, we
conducted separate analyses for trials using subordinate and
basic categories. Recall that there were three types of
subordinate trials, corresponding to whether the picture and
category name came from: (1) the same basic category, (2)
the same superordinate, or (3) different superordinates,
i.e., were unrelated. As Table 3a shows, subjects responded
slowest when the picture and name came from the same basic
category. However, when the picture and name were related
only by being in the same superordinate, subjects were as
fast as they were for unrelated picture-name pairs. The
overall effects of relatedness were reliable: E(2,22) =
23.80, 24.53, 16.48, for the subordinate-, basic- and
superordinate-first groups, all ps < .001. All 36 subjects
responded more slowly on same-basic than on same-
superordinate trials, but the difference between same-
superordinate and unrelated trials was non-significant in
analyses on the individual groups as well as in an analysis
where all the data were combined, all E's < 1.10.
Finally, for trials where a basic .name occurred, the
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picture could either be in the same superordinate as the
name or unrelated to it (See Table 3b). The relatedness
effects were small and nonsignificant for the basic- and
superordinate-first groups, E's < 1, and only marginally
significant for the subordinate-first group, £(1,11) = 3.88,
< .10.
Discussion
The true RTs showed a clear-cut basic-level
superiority. Thus the effect is not due solely to
variations in name-length and/or perceptibility of
distinguishing features, or to the use of totally unfamiliar
categories (the three specific confounds in Rosch et al.,
1976). Moreover, the basic-level superiority obtained
regardless of whether basic categories were learned first or
last, and in a situation where the overall frequency of a
category and the conjoint frequency of category-picture
pairs never favored basic categories. So order-of-learning
and frequency factors do not seem to be responsible for the
basic-level superiority either. In short, Experiment 1
provides some evidence against a host of alternative
accounts of Rosch et al's, results, thereby increasing the
plausibility of their distinctive-attributes explanation.
The only notable effect of learning order was that the
superordinate-first group responded faster to superordinates
than the other groups did. A possible explanation for this
Basic-Level Superiority
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is that when subjects learned the superordinates first, they
could not code them in terms of lower-level categories,
which may be the way people typically represent natural
language superordinates (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976, pp.
281); instead, they may have developed mnemonics to help
them categorize the tools directly at the superordinate
level, a process that might be more efficient than the
natural procedure used by the other groups.
One of our results for true responses, however, is
dissimilar from the findings of Rosch et al. (1976); we
found that subordinates were processed almost as quickly as
basic categories, rather than being the slowest. Thus,
Rosch et al.'s results may have been partly determined by
variations in factors like name length and perceptibility of
distinguishing attributes. The difference between basic and
subordinate true RT over our three learning groups was only
45 msec (the difference was significant for two of the
groups) so it may be questioned whether there is any real
difference between the two levels across all three groups.
A four-way analysis of variance (groups x level x blocks x
subjects) with only the data from these two levels showed
that the 45 msec difference was reliable, £(1,33) = 15.23,
< .001, and there was no interaction with groups, E < 1.
The data for false RTs also showed that basic
categorizations were faster than superordinate ones; but now
Basic-Level Superiority
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subordinate categorizations were slightly faster than basic
categorizations, by 22 msec over all three groups. In an
analysis of variance on these data for all three groups
combined, this difference was not significant, £(1,33) =
1.03, nor were any of the interactions.
Experiment 2
We have discredited a number of obvious alternative
explanations of Rosch et al.'s basic-level superiority, but
there is a less obvious one to be considered. Suppose that
as a result of learning, subjects constructed a hierarchical
representation of the categories, similar- to that shown in
Figure 2. When a picture is presented, all three category
names for that picture are activated to some extent, with
activation spreading along the links in the hierarchical
network (as in Collins & Loftus, 1975, or Anderson, 1976).
Since basics receive activation from both subordinates and
superordinates, but the other two levels receive activation
from only basics, basics will reach a criterial level of
activation sooner. According to this account, then, it is
its medial position in a hierarchical structure that causes
the basic level to be superior. Experiment 2 tests this
alternative by seeking a basic-level superiority with
categories that are not organized hierarchically.
Figure 3 shows the categories used. The superordinates
do not include the basics, nor do the basics include the
Basic-Level Superiority
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subordinates. (A natural category analogue would be to use
furniture and tool as superordinates, apple and orange as
basic categories, and collie and dachshund as subordinates.)
The basics and subordinates were taken from the previous
experiment, while the superordinates were functionally-
defined categories composed of new tools. The subordinates
have many features common to their members, but also overlap
greatly with their contrast categories. The basic
categories have almost as many attributes common to their
members, but these attributes are distinctive.
Superordinates have only the functional attribute common to
their members. Thus, although the categories are not
hierarchically structured, they meet the same criteria for
subordinates, basics, and superordinates as used in
Experiment 1.
Because the categories are not organized
hierarchically, each category can have the same number of
members. Consequently, we can simultaneously hold constant
(across levels) both category frequency and the conjoint
frequency of a name-picture pair, as well as number of
categories at each level (two), category size (two tools per
category), and position in the category structure. Another
change from the previous study was that the nonsense-
syllable names were randomly reassigned to categories.
SUPERORDINATE
INSTANCE
BASIC
INSTANCE
SUBORDINATE
INSTANCE
WAM (scraper) PIM (stirrers)
I, I2 13 14
(11-4 are different basic tools)
HOB (hammer) NOP (pizza cutter)
II Iz I3 14
(narrow (wide (short (long
head) head) shaft) shaft)
REL (two-part TIS (one-parthandle) handle)
I, 12 13 14(large) (small) (large) (small)
Figure 3. The categories used in Experiment 2. The names
in parentheses are for expository purposes only.
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Method
Subjects. Sixteen Stanford undergraduates fulfilled a
course requirement by performing in the experiment. They
were divided equally into two groups differing in learning
order.
Materials. The pictures were slides of the twelve
specific tools described in the bottom rows of the panels of
Figure 3. Each subject learned 2 subordinates, 2 basics,
and 2 superordinates. Half the subjects learned one pair of
subordinates (the single and double-handled bricks) and half
learned another (the narrow- and wide-headed hammers). All
subjects learned the pizza cutters and knives as the two
basic categories. Two new superordinate categories were
created, which we refer to as stirrers and scrapers. The
instances of each superordinate were two perceptually
dissimilar tools that could be used for the function
associated with that category.
Procedure. The learning phase was similar to that of
the previous experiment. One difference, however, was that
now subjects heard each category name the same number of
times (there was no repetition of errors). Another
difference was that two new learning orders were used:
subordinates- basics- superordinates and superordinates-
basics- subordinates.
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The categorization task was also similar to Experiment
1: 10 blocks, with the first 2 being practice. However,
since now there were only 6 categories, each block had only
12 trials. Each category occurred once on a true trial and
once on a false trial in each block, with every picture
shown once per block. False trials always contained a
category name paired with a picture from the contrast
category (i.e., the other category at the same level).
Since the different levels of categories were unrelated,
none of the relatedness manipulations used in Experiment 1
were possible here.
Results
Analyses of variance were performed on average RTs with
errors and wild scores replaced by the mean of that cell for
that subject. (A wild score was here defined as a response
more than three standard deviations greater than the mean
for that subject's cell.) Only 3.9% of the responses were
errors, and 1.2% wild scores. The analyses were performed
separately for true and false responses, with the factors
being levels, order of learning, particular subordinates
learned (bricks or hammers), and blocks.
Table 4 contains
RTs. We have collapsed
different subordinates.
between these groups'
the results for both true and false
over the two groups that learned
(There were no reliable differences
true RTs, and although the false RTs
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showed a 200 msec advantage for the group that learned brick
subordinates, F(1,12) = 5.46, p < .05, there were no
reliable interactions involving this factor). The three
categorization levels were reliably different, £(2,24) =
5.03, P < .025 for trues, and £(2,24) = 6.61, p < .01
falses, the means following the same pattern as in
Experiment 1. For true RTs, basics were faster than
subordinates, which in turn were faster than superordinates;
for false RTs, basics were faster than superordinates and
4
about equal to subordinates.
The true RTs showed no effect of order of learning; its
main effect was negligible, F < 1, and its interaction with
levels was non-significant, F(2,24) = 2.16, p >.10. For
false RTs, again there was no main effect of order, F(1,12)
< 1, but there was an interaction with levels, £(2,24) =
6.25, p < .01. As Table 4 shows, when the superordinates
were learned first, all three levels were responded to
equally quickly, but when subordinates were learned first,
basics are responded to fastest, and superordinates by far
the slowest. As for practice, although, subjects improved
significantly over blocks, there was no hint of any
interaction involving this factor (all p's > .10 for the
true and false analyses).
Discussion
The findings for true RTs replicated the results of the
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first experiment, thereby indicating that the basic-level
superiority does not hinge on position in a hierarchical
structure, or on category frequency, conjoint frequency,
number of categories per level, or number of instances in a
category. One difference from Experiment 1, though, is that
in the present study true RTs were substantially faster (111
msec) for basics than subordinates, £(1.24) = 6.98, , < .
025. The most likely reason why this difference was so much
larger in the present experiment is that subordinate false
trials were probably more related than basic false trials--
i.e., contrasting categories were more similar at the
subordinate level (see Figure 3)--which means that the
discrimination between true and false at the subordinate
level was more difficult in the present experiment than in
the first study.
The present results for false RTs were less clear-cut.
When subjects learned categories in the order superordinate-
basic-subordinate, the false RTs for the three levels were
almost identical; when subjects learned categories in the
reverse order, the expected basic-level superiority was
found. Why false and true RTs should differ this way is
unclear.
For the true RTs, the results for the five learning
orders used in Experiments 1 and 2, are unambiguous: basic
categories are always fastest, subordinates are usually
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faster than superordinates, with the order of the latter two
being partly determined by learning order. What
explanations are possible for these results? Rosch et al.
suggested that basic categories, being the most distinctive,
are accessed first, with subordinates identified by
inspection of an additional feature, and superordinates
identified by inference from the basic level. Although this
is a plausible hypothesis, it fails to make predictions for
all the comparisons involving false RTs, and it needs to be
altered for the non-hierarchical categories used in
Experiment 2. For these reasons, and because we desire a
more fine-grained analysis of this categorization task, we
have been led to different account of the basic-level
superiority.
The model we propose is illustrated in Figure 4. -On
hearing the category name, the subject presumably prepares
for the upcoming picture by: (1) activating a perceptual
representation of the category (e.g., a visual image or
propositional description); and (2) setting criteria on the
number of matching and mismatching features that will be
needed to trigger true and false responses, respectively.
When the picture appears, the subject compares its features
to those of the perceptual representation of the category,
recording on one counter each match, and on another each
mismatch i.e., either a contradiction between picture and
category features or a picture feature with no category
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counterpart. When the number of matches or mismatches
reaches one of the pre-set criteria, the subject responds
true or false, respectively.
According to this preparation model, the advantage of
basic and subordinate categories over superordinates arises
because people typically do not have a single, perceptual
representation for a superordinate (as Rosch, et al., 1976,
showed); thus people must activate two (or more) perceptual
representations when the target category is a superordinate.
Maintaining this extra representation during the feature-
matching process likely requires extra capacity; and the
presence of this extra representation means that extra
feature matches will be needed on the average. Both these
consequences should eventuate in lengthened RTs compared to
the case when the category is at a lower level, and only one
perceptual representation is activated.
The advantage of basic over subordinate categories
arises because people set differential true and false
criteria for categories at the two levels. We assume that
criteria are set so as to maximize discrimination between
the target category and any category that contrasts with it.
For example, if the category presented was brick, criteria
are set so as to maximize discrimination from hammer, since
that is the closest "false" category. Since subordinates
have greater overlap with their contrast categories than do
Basic-Level Superiority
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Set true and false
criteria for category
Prepare perceptual Encode perceptual Compare Criterion
representation of representation of features matches Yes Rp
category (C) picture (P) of C and P m .is o sp
Category -- I sec --- Picture No
name
Figure 4. The preparation model for the categorization
task.
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basics, the true criterion should be set higher for
subordinates. And the higher the criterion, the longer the
feature-comparison process, and the longer the RT. To
illustrate, if the category is wide-headed hammers (a
subordinate) but the narrow-headed hammer is shown, there
will be many matches output from the comparer so a high
criterion for true responses is needed to avoid false
alarms. However, if the category is hammer (a basic), no
other object besides a hammer will produce many matches, so
fewer matches are required to reach a true decision.
For false responses, however, the criterion should be
set slightly lower for subordinates than for basics. The
rationale for this hinges on the fact that a mismatch can
mean either that a picture feature contradicted its
counterpart in the category representation, or that a
picture feature found no counterpart in the category
representation. The occurrence of a contradiction is
equally diagnostic of a false response for subordinates and
basics; failure to find a counterpart, however, is more
diagnostic of a false response for subordinate-category
representations than for basic ones because the former
contain more features. This line of reasoning suggests that
false RT should be slightly faster for subordinates than
basics,, which was the case in Experiment 1 though not in
Experiment 2. This prediction, though, is too strong. It
ignores differences between subordinates and basics that do
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not have to do with the decision component (e.g., aspects of
the feature-comparison process). A more conservative
prediction is that the advantage of basics over subordinates
should be greater with true than false responses. This
prediction obtained in both the present experiments, as well
as in Rosch et al (1976).
Finally, the relatedness effects on false RTs would be
attributed to the feature-comparison process of the model.
When the picture and category representation are
perceptually similar, false responses will take longer since
the comparator will take longer to find the criterion number
of mismatches. This predicts that for trials with
subordinate categories, false RTs should be long when
pictures and categories were related at the basic level but
not when they were related only at the superordinate level,
because only the former are perceptually similar. Identical
reasoning predicts that for trials with basic categories,
false RTs should be the same for pairs related at the
superordinate level and for unrelated pairs. Both these
findings were obtained in Experiment 1 (they could not be
tested in Experiment 2).
The preparation model ignores naming and inferences,
but this may not be unreasonable for well-practiced subjects
with a restricted set of materials (conditions that also
characterized Rosch et al.'s Experiment 7 and Smith et al's
experiments).
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Experiment 1
This experiment tests two claims of the preparation
model: (1) true RTs to superordinates are slow because such
categories lack a unique perceptual representation; and (2)
the relatedness effects on false RTs are due to perceptual
not semantic similarity.
To get at these issues we used categories that had the
same hierarchical structure as that in Experiment 1: two
high-, four middle- and eight low-level categories. Unlike
the earlier experiment, though, the present categories did
not fall into the usual superordinate-basic-subordinate
order--see Figure 5. The eight low-level categories were
basic (four basics from Experiment 1 plus four others); the
four middle-level categories were defined functionally
(tools for cutting, pounding, scraping and stirring); and
the two high-level categories were defined perceptually
(large and small tools).
Based on the preparation model, we expect the
following: (1) since each low-level category has many
distinctive perceptual attributes, subjects should be able
to prepare a unitary perceptual representation of it and
rapidly categorize the picture; (2) since each middle-level
category has no obvious perceptual feature (like most
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superordinates), subjects should be unable to prepare a
perceptual representation of it, and hence their
categorization times should be substantially longer than for
the low-level categories; and (3) since each high-level
category has a distinctive perceptual feature, namely its
size, subjects should be able to prepare a perceptual
representation of the category (prepare to see a large or
small figure), and their categorization times should be
5
faster than those associated with the middle level. Thus we
expect categorization times to first increase and then
decrease as we move up the hierarchy, the exact opposite of
the pattern we obtained in Experiment 1.
These categories also allow us to test our claim that
relatedness effects on false RT are due to the perceptual
similarity of the category and picture, rather than to
semantic similarity (which, in these experiments, means
membership in the same category). In Experiment 1, the
major relatedness effect was that, on subordinate trials,
RTs were slower to name-picture pairs related at the middle-
level (basic) than to pairs related at only the high-level
(superordinate). Presumably this effect came about because
representations of pairs related at the middle level shared
more perceptual features than representations of pairs
related at only the high level; however, these pairs were
also more semantically related than those related at the
high level. In the present experiment, name-picture pairs
Basic-Level Superiority
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related at the middle-level (i.e., with a common function)
should not take longer than pairs related at the high-level
because the representations of the former are no more
perceptually similar than those of the latter. Experiment 1
essentially serves as a control for this null prediction
because the semantic structure is identical for both
studies.
HIGH SC
MEDIUM NOP (cutter)
LOW ZIM TIS
(knife) (pizza
cutter)
INSTANCE I, 12 13 14
)M (large)
VAD (stirrer)
COM LAR
(wedge) (carrot)
15 I6 17 8I
PIM (small)
WAM (scraper) FAC (pounder)
HOB BOT MUL REL
(scoop) (rake) (hammer) (brick)
/\ \ /
I9 I10 III I12 113 114 115 116
Figure 5. The hierarchy of categories used in Experiment 3.
The names in parentheses are for expository
purposes only.
Subjects. Twelve Stanford undergraduates fulfilled a
course requirement by participating in the experiment. They
were divided into two groups based on a post-experimental
questionnaire (described below).
Materials. The 16 pictures included 8 used in
Experiment 1, plus 8 additional ones. The latter included
two variations on the four basic tools used in Experiment 2,
and were constructed with the same constraints as used in
Experiment 1. That is, each category at the lowest level
contained two tools that were highly similar to one other
(e.g., serrated and straight-edge knives) but differed
greatly from other tools at that level. Pairs of these low-
level categories were combined according to function to form
four middle-level categories--stirrers, cutters, scrapers,
and pounders. Then pictures of the stirrers and cutters
were enlarged and combined into one high-level category,
defined by the feature of "large", while pictures of the
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scrapers and pounders were reduced and formed the other
high-level category, that defined by "small". The small
pictures were at most 33% of the area of the large pictures.
The category names were the same as those used in the
previous experiments, but were randomly re-assigned to
categories.
Procedure. The learning procedure was the same as that
of Experiment 1, with appropriate changes in the category
descriptions for the new functionally-defined and size-
defined categories. All subjects learned the middle
categories first, the low-level categories second and the
high-level categories last (following the basic-first
condition of Experiment 1, although here the middle-level
categories are not basic).
The categorization procedure was the same as Experiment
1, with the addition of a questionnaire at the end of the
testing. One question asked subjects what they did in the
interval between name and picture, e.g., "keep your mind
blank?", "try to think what the named tool would look
like?". Another question asked subjects what they did when
the experimenter said the names of the high-level categories
(those defined by size), e.g., "try to think of all pictures
with that name? try to think of one particular picture with
that name? get ready to see a large or small picture?" As
explained in the Results section, the last question was used
to divide the subjects into two groups.
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Results.ý
In pilot testing, some subjects reported that they
ignored the size cue. The questionnaire used in the main
experiment allowed us to divide the subjects into those who
used the size cue and those who did not: eight subjects
chose the response "get ready to see a large or a small
picture" to the question of how they prepared for the high-
level categories (these subjects comprise the size group),
while four chose a different response (the no-size group).
Our predictions about the effect of category levels on RT
apply only to the size group. Although there are only four
subjects in the no-size group, the differences between the
groups are striking enough to be of interest. There were an
average of 2.2% and 1.9% errors, and of 0.7% and .3% wild
scores for the size and no-size groups, respectively.
Again, these were too few errors to analyze meaningfully.
True Rts. The average true RTs are in Table 5. For
the size group, the results are as predicted: the low-level
(basic) categories were fastest, the middle-level
(functionally-defined) categories were slowest, and the
high-level (size) categories were inbetween. The overall
difference due to category level was highly reliable,
£(2,14) = 22.7, 9 < .001. And orthogonal contrasts showed
that the middle categories were slower than the other two,
£(1,14) = 41.6, p < .001, and that the superiority of the
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low over the high-level categories was marginally
significant, £(1,14) = 3.85, < .10. For the no-size
group, the data followed the pattern expected if middle- and
high-level categories were inferred from low-level (basic)
categories; RT increased with level in the hierarchy, £(2,6)
= 13.1, p < .01.
False RTs. As usual, only unrelated category-picture
pairs were analyzed to test the effect of categorization
level. For the size group, false RTs followed the pattern
of the true data (see Table 5), £(2,14) = 8.5, 9 < .005.
Orthogonal contrasts again showed that the functionally-
defined, middle-level was slower than the other two, E(1,14)
= 10.4, f < .01, and that low-level categories were
responded to faster than high-level ones, £(1,14) = 6.5, p <
.025. The pattern for the no-size group also followed the
true data: RT increased with hierarchical level, F(2,6) =
13.9, p < .01.
Relatedness effects were first examined for trials
where the category was from the low level. The means are in
Table 6. The overall effect of relatedness was substantial
in the no-size group, £(2,6) = 7.9, P < .025; however, it
failed to reach significance in the size group, £(2,14) =
2.2, P > .10. The latter null result is surprising; while
we did not expect any difference between name-picture pairs
related at the middle-level and those related only at the
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high-level (for both kinds of pairs, only the feature of
size is shared), we did expect RTs to be fastest to
unrelated pairs (they contain no shared perceptual feature).
In any event, the same expectations apply to the no-size
group (there is no reason to expect any difference between
the groups on subordinate trials), and here, the pattern of
results is as predicted; there was no difference between
name-picture pairs related at the middle level and those
related only at the high level, £(1,6) < 1, while RTs were
faster to unrelated pairs than to those related at the high
level, E(1,6) = 14.8, P < .05.
Trials where the category names were from the middle
level offer us another chance to check the relatedness
predictions. Again we expect faster RTs to unrelated name-
picture pairs (no shared, perceptual feature) than to pairs
related at the high level (size feature shared). This time
the data are completely in line with expectations--See Table
6. In the size group, RTs were about 200 msec faster to
unrelated pairs than to pairs related at the high level,
£(1,7) = 6.3, 9 < .05, and the no-size group showed a
comparable trend, E(1,3) = 7.3, < .10. These results
contrast strongly with those of Experiment 1, where
relatedness at the high level (i.e., being members of the
same superordinate) never produced a significant effect,
even though each group there had more subjects than either
group here This contrast in results between the two
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experiment attests to the perceptual nature of relatedness
effects, since the highest level was defined perceptually
here but functionally in Experiment 1.
uestionnaire responses. All subjects but one said
that while waiting for the picture to appear, they tried to
think what the named tool(s) would look like and prepared to
see a picture like that. These self-report data lend
support to a critical assumption of the preparation model.
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middle level (there, the basic level), but no such effect
was found here (where the middle level was functionally-
defined). Given these contrasting results, it seems most
unlikely that the results in either experiment were in any
way an artifact of the particular names used, number of
categories at each level, category size, etc.
General Discussion
Discussion
The results generally supported the preparation model.
True RTs for the size group were faster for categories
defined perceptually than for those defined functionally,
and analyses of relatedness effects on false RTs generally
indicated that perceptual similarity between target category
and picture, rather than semantic similarity, determines the
ease of responding. (The one exception to this being the
null results for the size group on trials with subordinate
categories). These conclusions rest partly on comparisons
with Experiment 1. The hierarchical structure of the
categories there was the same as in the present study, but
there the middle level was the fastest while here it was the
slowest. Also, in Experiment 1, relatedness at the high
level had no effect on false RT while in the present study
it did. Furthermore, all 36 subjects of Experiment 1 had
slower RTs when picture and category are related at the
The Role of Mediation
One criticism of this research is that the categories
used may not have been "artificial" enough, i.e., subjects
might have associated each of our categories with the
natural category most similar to it and used the latter as a
mediator. If our basic categories were mediated by natural
basic categories, then many of our results could be.
artifactual. (This hypothesis could not explain all our
results, e.g., why the size categories of Experiment 3 were
faster than the function categories.) To evaluate this
hypothesis, we asked 13 Stanford students to name a picture
from each basic category used in Experiment 3 (which
included those used in Experiments 1 and 2) in order to
determine the similarity of our pictured tools to natural
objects. For comparison, we included an equal number of
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line drawings of real objects. After naming each picture,
subjects rated how well the picture fit that name on a 7-
point scale (where 1 meant the picture fit the name very
well, and I meant that they were only guessing what the name
was) .
Subjects found only poor names for the artificial
categories, with one exception. Seven of the pictures
received median ratings of between 4 and 6 on the scale,
seemingly indicating that the pictures were not good
examples of natural categories. Furthermore, the suggested
names were often vague (e.g., "design") or were the names of
part of an object (e.g., "front of farm equipment")--labels
that would not be efficient mediators of perceptual
categorization. In contrast, all the pictures of natural
objects had median ratings of 1.5 or lower, indicating that
these objects were recognizable members of natural
categories (though not always basic categories). The one
exception to the results for artificial categories was the
picture of the hammer; its median rating was 1. However,
the most popular name for this picture was not "hammer," but
rather "ax" or "hatchet" (given by 9 out of 13 subjects),
which seems to be an inappropriate mediator for a tool known
to be a pounder. Furthermore, the basic category advantage
was found in Experiment 2, both when the hammer pictures did
not occur at all, and when they occurred only as subordinate
categories, suggesting that natural category mediation was
not a factor in these experiments.
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General Implications
Rosch et al. (1976) claimed that objects are
categorized faster at the basic level than at the
subordinate or superordinate levels because basic categories
are associated with more distinctive attributes. Our
studies provide strong support for this claim as long as it
is qualified to mean perceptual attributes. But, though we
agree with Rosch et al. on the importance of distinctive
attributes, our preparation model differs appreciably from
their rough view of processing. Their view must assume that
objects are categorized first at the basic level, and
further assumes that categorization at the subordinate or
superordinate level requires an additional process (either
checking a distinguishing feature, or drawing an inference).
In contrast, the preparation model in no way assumes basic
categories are special. Rather, the superiority of basic
categories is a natural consequence of the model's
processing assumptions and the fact that basic categories
have more distinctive features.
The preparation model is also compatible with other
findings on picture categorization. Consider Smith et al's
(1978) finding that typical objects are easier to categorize
than atypical ones, (e.g., a pictured robin is categorized
as a bird faster than a pictured chicken is). The
preparation model can handle this result if it is assumed
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that typical instances are likely to share more perceptual
features with the category than do atypical instances (see
Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). Another finding of Smith et
al. (1978), however, 'seems to conflict with the preparation
model. Specifically, they found that false RTs were slowed
when the category and picture were related at the
superordinate level, where birds, fruit and vegetables
comprised one superordinate (living things), and tools.
furniture and clothing comprised the other (non-living
things). The preparation model has difficulty explaining
why it should be harder to respond that a pictured chair is
not a tool than that it is not a vegetable, since the
picture should have minimal perceptual overlap with either
category. It seemed to us, however, that fruit and
vegetables share many perceptual attributes, while the other
categories do not. Therefore, we reanalyzed the Smith et
al. false data, eliminating fruit-vegetable pairs. Before
reanalysis, the relatedness effect in question was a
significant 52 msec; after elimination, it dropped to an
nonsignificant 14 msec (the fruit-vegetable pairs took 220
6
msec longer than the mean of the other "related" pairs).
This post hoc analysis thus provides further evidence for
the preparation model.
What is the applicability of the preparation model to
categorization in everyday activities? The model
presupposes that a target category is pre-specified, as when
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a person tries to identify objects to achieve some goal
(e.g., looking for chairs vs. furniture in a cluttered
department store). Obviously, people can categorize objects
even when the category is not specified beforehand--in fact,
this may be the more typical situation. (In such cases, the
model described by Brownell, 1978, in which an object
activates the category that matches it most closely, may be
most appropriate.) Perhaps specifying a model with such a
restricted range of applicability seems a trivial endeavor
to some. We do it, however, out of the conviction that it
is impossible to specify and empirically test category
representations without a fairly detailed hypothesis of what
processes act on them to produce the obtained results (see
Smith & Medin, 1981, chapter 3 for a more detailed
argument).
As a way of attesting to the model's utility, let us
highlight what it tells us about category representation by
listing some forms of representation that are incompatible
with the model. First, the representation is not one where
certain categories are tagged as "basic" (as a result of
frequency or early learning, or whatever) and then are
preferentially used. Experiments 1 and 2 argued
convincingly against this. Second, the basic category
advantage cannot be a side-effect of conversational
pragmatics (see Cruse, 1976, for an analysis of this sort).
For example, one might suggest that the Grice's (1975) maxim
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"to be informative but not more so than required," entails
that people prefer to use basic categories. However, it is
difficult to conceptualize "informativeness" such that it
does not presuppose the theory of basic categories that
Rosch et al. proposed, yet still predicts our results. For
example, if informativeness depends on how many different
objects a category denotes, as well as how many it
distinguishes, then the category structures in Experiments 1
and 3 should have led to identical results--yet they showed
many striking differences. Third, the basic category is not
merely the middle category of a hierarchy (or, the middle of
the commonly-used categories of a hierarchy). Experiments 2
and 3 gave strong evidence contradicting this hypothesis.
Furthermore, our model's focus on perceptual attributes
ties in with a recent analysis of Rosch et al.'s proposed
category structure by Hemenway (1981). She found that the
basic level was the highest level judged to have many parts
common to category members, but that this was not true of
other types of attributes e.g., qualities and functions.
This would explain the importance of perceptual features,
since these are closely related to parts of objects (as
opposed to functions, which may have many different
perceptual instantiations). It may be that natural
categorization has evolved to attend primarily to perceptual
attributes, and that functional attributes are always
translated into disjunctive perceptual identification
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procedures for categorization purposes (see Miller &
Johnson-Laird, 1976, and Smith & Medin, 1981, for detailed
discussions of these issues).
So, even if our proposed processes are limited to cases
where a target category is pre-specified, our proposed
representations may be quite general. That is, there is no
reason to believe that the claims we have made about
category representations--e.g., that basic categories have
many distinctive perceptual properties--are task-specific.
Also, the model is easily extendible to other questions of
interest in categorization. For example, Rosch, et al.
(1976) have noted that experts may have different basic
levels (in their area of expertise) than the rest of the
population, presumably because they know more about
subordinate categories. Our model would predict that as one
learns more distinctive perceptual features at the
subordinate level, one's subordinate categorizations should
become more rapid, perhaps eventually being faster than
categorizations at what is normally the basic level.
Moreover, people who don't even know of the existence of
many subordinate categories (e.g., small children) may also
categorize faster at this level, since they know fewer
overlapping subordinate categories than most people. In
this case, the effect would be due to a low criterion for
true decisions for the subordinate category, causing these
people to respond faster, but also to make many errors at
this level.
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Footnotes
Such a variation in familiarity needs to be
distinguished from the specific confounding noted before
that some subordinates may be totally unfamiliar. Earlier
we were concerned with a binary distinction between
categories that subjects had some knowledge of versus those
that were totally unfamiliar; now we are concerned with a
continuous variation in familiarity among categories, most
of which subjects have some knowledge of.
2
One syllable was discarded because it was too similar
to an already chosen one; the next least meaningful syllable
on the list replaced it.
3
Through an oversight, the Basic-first group's
descriptions for the superordinates did not mention the
subordinates even though the latter had already been
learned. This seems unimportant, since a group very similar
to this one (see Footnote 5), but without the error, gave
the identical pattern of results as this group.
4
We should point out that the effect of levels is
partly confounded with materials, i.e., different pictures
were used at the three levels of categories. We attempted
to minimize this confounding by using two sets of
subordinates, and both showed the basic-subordinate
difference. But this does not rule out the chance that our
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levels effect is partly a picture effect in disguise.
However, this possibility seems to be ruled out by the
results of the next experiment, since there each of the
present pictures was tested at all levels of categorization,
and we found a levels effect like that of the present
experiment.
5
We know from other work that not all perceptual
features are sufficient for preparing a representation. In
a study not reported here, we used the same categories and
materials as in Experiment 1, and defined the superordinates
not by function but by a perceptual feature that described
the texture of the handle. What we have called cutters were
defined by having plain handles, while pounders were defined
by having textured handles (see Figure 1). Subjects seemed
unable to prepare a perceptual representation of a category
given only this perceptual feature, and the results were
virtually identical to those of Experiment 1; i.e.,
categorization was slowest at the highest level. After the
fact, these results seem unsurprising; a glance back at the
tools in Figure 1 indicates that the handles are not at the
same locations for all tools, and the hammer's textured
handle is quite different from the brick's. These kind of
problems do not seem to arise when the feature is a
particular size value.
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6
Rather than demonstrating an effect of perceptual
similarity, perhaps this change in results simply indicates
that Smith et al's pictures of fruits and vegetables were
not as good as the other pictures, so subjects took longer
to categorize them. This explanation fails, though, as
other judgments using the fruit and vegetable pictures were
59 msec faster than judgments involving the remaining
pictures.
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